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NOTES

What the Doctor Ordered:
Balancing Religion and Patient Rights
in U.S. Pharmacies
Rachel T Caudel
"An individual employee's personal beliefs cannot be allowed
to trample on women's constitutionally protected civil rights."'
"The United States was founded on the idea that people act on
their conscience-that they have a sense of right and wrong and do
what they think is right and moral ....Every pharmacist has the
right to do the same thing."3
INTRODUCTION

T

wo of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution
are the right to freely exercise one's religion and the right of personal
autonomy for all citizens.4 As early as 1923, the Supreme Court applied the
right to personal autonomy to decisions regarding marriage and family.5 The
Court has since extended this right to include the concept of individual
privacy, which, as has been described by a lower court, "encompasses
'6
decisions concerning the integrity and autonomy of one's body."

i B.A. Foreign Language /International Economics, magna cum laude,2005, University of
Kentucky; J.D. expected May 2009, University of Kentucky College of Law.
2 American Association of University Women, AAUWr Position on Reproductive Rights,
www.aauw.orgladvocacy/issue-advocacy/actionpages/reprorights.cfm
(last visited Oct. 5,
2008).
3 Rob Stein, 'Pro-Life' Drugstores Market Beliefs; No Contraceptives For Chantilly Shop,
WASHINGTON POST,June 16, 2oo8, at Ao I(quoting Tom Brejcha).
4 The Supreme Court has long held that the Bill of Rights protects certain liberties that,
though unspecified, are fundamental to an individual's ability to function in society. These
rights include a right to privacy and autonomy over one's own body. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
5 See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Meyer, along with Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925), marked the beginning of a period of more liberal
interpretation of due process.
6 Johnson v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 498 ESupp. 5S5, 574 (D.C.Tex. 198o); See also
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The tension between the right of autonomy over one's own body and the
right to freely practice one's religion came into sharp focus with the debate
surrounding pharmacists' refusals to distribute emergency contraception.
Today, these rights are clashing in courts and state legislatures across the
United States. This note examines the competing rights of the women who
are prescribed and the pharmacists who dispense emergency contraception
and other sexual health pharmaceuticals. It also proposes a solution that
protects the rights of both parties.
Part I of this Note begins with a discussion of the recent controversy
pertaining to the delicate balance of a woman's right to privacy with a
pharmacist's right to free exercise of religion.' Next, Part II focuses on the
rights of privacy and autonomy afforded these women as citizens of the
United States." Part III considers the rights of pharmacists and the impact
of mandatory dispensation laws on these rights. 9 Finally, Part IV proposes
a workable solution to balance the protected interests of women and
pharmacists alike. 10
I.

BACKGROUND

For several decades, women in the United States and throughout
Europe have taken emergency contraceptives, sometimes referred to as
the "morning after pill," to reduce the risk of pregnancy after unprotected
sexual intercourse." Emergency contraceptive pills (ECPs) are hormonal
drugs that are intended for use when other means of contraception have
failed. ECPs, taken up to 72 hours after coitus, work by preventing the
release of an egg (ovulation) and changing the womb and cervical mucus
to make it more difficult for an egg to meet sperm (fertilization). 2 ECPs
are not medically considered to be an abortion 3method, because, unlike
abortifacients, ECPs work prior to implantation.'

Lawrence
7 See
8 See
9 See

v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
infra text accompanying notes 11-35.
infra text accompanying notes 36-54.
infra text accompanying notes 55-74.

1o See infra text accompanying notes 75-111.
ii Charlotte Ellertson, History and Efficacy of Emergency Contraception:Beyond Coca-Cola,
28 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 44,44.
12 See, e.g., Plan B Patient Pamphlet available at http://www.gozplanb.com/PDF/
PatientPamphlet.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2oo8).
13 See, e.g., id. The U.S. government and leading medical societies define pregnancy
as beginning at implantation, not fertilization, therefore, a contraceptive that works prior to
implantation is not medically considered to be abortion. 'Plan B' Gets FDA's Over-Counter
Approval, National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 24, 2oo6, available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=570526o.
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"The roots of modern emergency contraception date back to the
1920s,"' I4 but until 1998 no post-coital emergency contraceptive method
had been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Women
relied on off-label use of regular contraceptives and other medications to
achieve a similar result. I" In 1998 when the FDA first approved a postcoital emergency contraceptive method, Preven, I6 it was met with little
controversy. However, with the FDA approval of an additional post-coital
emergency contraceptive method 7 and an increase in the number of
prescriptions for emergency contraceptives, controversy developed around
emergency contraceptive dispensation.
In many instances across the United States, pharmacists have refused
to dispense emergency contraceptives, I" which is particularly problematic
for the women impacted by such refusals given the nature of the drug.
Emergency contraception, unlike regular hormonal birth control, must be
taken within seventy-two hours of intercourse to be effective.' 9 Because
emergency contraceptive pills only prevent pregnancy and cannot terminate
an existing pregnancy, any delay in taking the pills results in a greater risk
of becoming pregnant. 0 According to the New EnglandJournalof Medicine,
the total number of pharmacists' refusals is unknown, but reports of
pharmacists' refusals date back to 1991 and have seen a steady increase
since the FDA approval of emergency contraceptives in 1998.1 Estimates
indicate that there have been 180 refusals in the United States in just six
months' time. 2
In 2004, a rape victim took her prescription for emergency contraception
to an Eckerd's pharmacy in Texas, where she was told by each of the three
pharmacists on duty that she could not have this medication because it

14 A.A. Haspels & R. Andriesse, The Effect of Large Doses of Estrogens Post Coitum in 2000
Women, 3 EUR. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY AND REPROD. BIOLOGY 113-17 (1973); P. E A.
Van Look & H. von Hertzen, Emergency Contraception,49 BRITISH MED. BULL. 158, 159-60
(1993).
15 Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California, A BriefHistory ofEmergency Contraceptives,
http://www.ppacca.org/site/pp.asp?c=kuJYJeO4F&b= 139489 (last visited Oct. 5, 2oo8).
I6 FDA, Preven approval package, http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/nda/98/2o946.pdf (last
visited Oct. 1o, 2oo8).
17 In I999, the FDA approved a second post-coital emergency contraception package,
Plan B (Levonorgestrel). FDA, Plan B approval packakage, http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/
nda/99/2 I-045_PlanB.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2oo8).
I8 Access to Birth Control Act, H.R. 2596, 1 oth Cong. § 2(9) (referred to the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, June 6, 2007).
19 See sources cited supra notes 12, 14, and I6.
20 See sources cited supra notes 12, 14, and I6.
21 Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of ConscientiousObjection-May PharmacistsRefuse
to FillPrescriptionsfor Emergency Contraception?19 NEW ENG. J. MED. 351, 2008-12 (2004).
22 See Editorial, Moralists at the Pharmacy,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, §4, at 12.
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"violated [the pharmacist's] morals." 3 The victim was only able to fill her
prescription at a Walgreen's pharmacy later that evening, thereby delaying
ingestion and increasing her risk of pregnancy.2 4 Similarly, a woman in New
Hampshire was denied emergency contraceptives by a Brooks pharmacist,
who claimed moral objections to both dispensing and transferring the
prescription. 5 By the time the managers at this Brooks Pharmacy resolved
the situation, a substantial amount of time had passed and the woman had
become pregnant.2 6
Often, the refusal to fill this type of prescription comes not only with
a decreased risk of efficacy and an unplanned pregnancy, but also a moral
"scolding" or misinformation about potential side effects and how the drug
works. For example, when a woman and her husband took her prescription
for birth-control pills to a CVS pharmacy in Texas, the pharmacist refused
to fill her prescription. 7 The pharmacist told the couple "birth control was
not right" and "[birth-control] pills cause cancer."2 8
State legislatures have been quick to respond to pharmacists' refusals to
fill birth-control prescriptions. Some states have enacted statutes expressly
authorizing pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control or emergency
contraception. While the Arkansas statute on family planning requires
that all medically acceptable contraceptive procedures be made available
without discrimination, it also provides, in part, that:
[niothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a physician, pharmacist, or
any other authorized paramedical personnel from refusing to furnish
any contraceptive procedures, supplies, or information; and [n]o private
institution or physician, nor any agent or employee of the institution or
physician, nor any employee of a public institution acting under directions
of a physician, shall be prohibited from refusing to provide contraceptive
procedures, supplies, and information when the refusal is based upon
religious or conscientious objection. No such institution, employee, agent,
29
or physician shall be held liable for the refusal .

23 Lyndsay Knecht & Margaret Myrick, Protesters FightPharmacy:Groups Target Eckerd's
for Violating Rights, N. TEX. DAILY, Feb. 3, 2oo4, availableat http://media.www.ntdaily.com/

media/storage/paper877/news/2004/02/03/UndefinedSection/Protesters.Fight.Pharmacy188988o.shtml.
24 Liz Austin, FriendRecountsRape Victim's SearchforMorning-AfterPill,ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Feb. 21, 2004; Angela K. Brown, Woman Said PharmacistDenied Her Birth-ControlPrescription.
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 31,2004; Knecht & Myrick, supra note 23.
25 Pharmacist Denies Woman's Request for Morning-After Pill, N.H. UNION LEADER
(Manchester, N.H.), Sept. 27, 2oo4, at C7.
26 Id.
27 Brown, supra note 24.
28

Id.

29 ARK. CODE ANN.

(2O08);

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70
§ 68-34-1O4 (West 1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903 (1981).

§ 20-16-304 (West 2oo6);seealso, e.g.,

TENN.CODEANN.
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Although some states have chosen to authorize refusals, other states
have imposed sanctions on individual pharmacists who refuse to dispense
contraceptives. A Kmart pharmacist in Wisconsin, Neil Noesen, refused to
fill or transfer a birth-control prescription because he thought birth control
was sinful. 30 The Wisconsin Department of Regulation and Licensing
brought a disciplinary proceeding against Noesen, alleging that Noesen
failed to fulfill his professional obligations.3 The administrative judge
made a recommendation to the Wisconsin State Pharmacy Examining
Board regarding the proper response to Mr. Noesen's conduct.3" In her
order, the judge found that Mr. Noesen's refusal "constitute[d] a danger to
the health, welfare, or safety of a patient," and that in so doing, Mr. Noesen
"has practiced in a manner which substantially departs from the standard
of care ordinarily exercised by a pharmacist .... ,,33 In her recommendations
to the Wisconsin Pharmacy Examining Board, the Administrative Law
Judge wrote, this pharmacist "clearly needs training in the ethics of his
profession," and ordered that he be required to take ethics courses for
34
pharmacists.
Still other states have taken a third approach and enacted statutes
requiring pharmacists to fill any legal prescription, regardless of moral
convictions. The New Jersey statute on pharmacy practice requires a
pharmacy "to properly fill lawful prescriptions for prescription drugs or
devices that it carries for customers, without undue delay, despite any
conflicts of employees to filling a prescription and dispensing a particular
prescription drug or device due to sincerely held moral, philosophical or
35
religious beliefs.
Each of the measures outlined above has sparked controversy among
political groups on the grounds that each measure infringes on someone's

30 Nonparty Brief of American Civil Liberties Union and The American Civil Liberties
Union of Wisconsin Foundation, Noeson v. State, No. 2005CV212, at 6 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007),
available at http://www.aclu-wi.org/wisconsin/rights-of-women/PharmRefusalAmicus.
shtml.
31 Press Release, Center for Law & Religious Freedom, Christian Legal Society, Center
for Law & Religious Freedom Files Brief in Support of Catholic Pharmacist Prosecuted
for Refusing to Dispense Contraceptives (Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://www.clsnet.
org/clrfPages/prWisconsinvNoesen2.php?mode=print; In the Matter of the Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Neil Noeson, No. LS-031oo9-PHM (State of Wisconsin Pharmacy
Examining Board, Apr. 13, 2005) (final decision and order).
32 In the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceedings Against Neil Noeson, No. LS-o3 1009PHM (State of Wisconsin Pharmacy Examining Board Apr. 13, 2005) (final decision and
order).
33 Id. at 3.
34 Id. at 23.
35 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-67.1 (West 2oo8); see also, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. § 733 (West
2007); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68 § 1330.91 (2008).
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constitutionally protected rights-either the rights guaranteeing freedom of
religion or the rights of personal autonomy, privacy, and equal protection.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND SEXUAL HEALTH

State laws that specifically allow pharmacists the right to refuse to
dispense prescribed medications are in direct conflict with women's
rights of personal autonomy, privacy, and equal protection. The U.S.
Constitution does not expressly provide for a right of privacy, but courts
have long recognized that this right exists.3 6 In 1961 the Supreme Court
stated that privacy rights exist, at least in some contexts, and acknowledged
that they were no less important than any other right guaranteed by the
Constitution.37 In Griswold v. Connecticut,38 the Court stated that multiple
provisions of the Constitution-the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
amendments-create zones of privacy, protecting "against all governmental
invasions 'of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."' 39 Then,
in 1973, the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Roe v. Wade reiterated
and reaffirmed that the right of privacy extends to decisions involving
44
43
marriage, 41 procreation, 4 contraception, and child rearing.
Four years after the decision in Roe v. Wade, the Court went further
in stating that restrictions on the distribution of contraceptives are clear
intrusions on protected rights of privacy.45 Indeed, the Court said that
regulations that "burden an individual's right to decide to prevent
conception ... by substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating
that decision" should be viewed with the same scrutiny as regulations
prohibiting the use of contraceptives altogether. 46 That is, the regulations
should only be upheld when justified by a compelling state interest and
narrowly tailored. 47 Based on this precedent, it is clear that the Court not
only views contraceptive use as a protected liberty interest, but also protects
access to contraceptives.
The Court has found state regulation limiting contraceptive sale to
licensed pharmacists to be unduly burdensome on the individual right
36
37
38
39
40
41

42
43

See supra note 4.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656 (I961).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
Roe v. Wade, 41o U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 152 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942)).
Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972)).

44 Id. at 153 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, z68 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).

45 Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687-88 (1977).
46 Id. at 688.
47 Id.
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of privacy and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.' Certainly, then, a
regulation that not only limits access to, but allows complete denial of
contraceptives at the discretion of a third party is also unduly burdensome
and should be a regulation subject to strict scrutiny.
In addition to raising issues with respect to privacy rights, statutes
regulating contraceptives may raise Equal Protection concerns. Regulations
are generally held to violate the Equal Protection Clause when they
purposefully discriminate against a certain class. 49 In other words, the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits regulations that are enacted because of their
consequences on a particular class. Roe v. Wade has been applied to hold
violative of the Equal Protection Clause, absent a compelling rationale,
the denial of certain contraceptive services when other services, similar
in risk and difficulty, are routinely performed."0 In Hathaway v. Worchester
City Hospital, the First Circuit struck down a city hospital's prohibition
on consensual sterilization operations, because other non-therapeutic
procedures of equal risk that were equally demanding on the hospital's
staff and resources were available.5"
Regulations that allow for refusal to dispense one type of contraceptive,
i.e. emergency contraceptives, and not others, seem to present an even
better case for clear discrimination against a certain class. Morning after pills
and standard birth-control pills are similar in risk and certainly application,
particularly given that standard birth-control pills can be taken in such a
manner to achieve the same post-coital pregnancy prevention provided
by emergency contraceptives.52 It is not, then, a stretch to see that courts
would apply Roe v. Wade to hold invalid regulations allowing for the refusal
to dispense a validly prescribed emergency contraceptive by a pharmacist
who fills other contraceptives or sexual health pharmaceuticals with similar
risks and costs.
The foregoing discussion illustrates that a woman's right to choose
whether or not to receive and take emergency contraception is protected
by more than one amendment of the Constitution and is supported by a
history of case law. Although case law suggests that historically many, if
not most, regulations restricting reproductive freedom have been struck
down,5 3 the Court has made it clear that limitations and restrictions on

48 Id. at 689.
49 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-83 (I973); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79,85 (1986); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 499 (Ky. 1992).
50 Hathaway v. Worchester City Hosp., 475 E2d 701, 705-06 (ist Cir. 1973).
51 Id.
52 Plan B Patient Pamphlet, supra note 12.

53 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.479,485(1965) (striking down law prohibiting
sale, prescription or use of contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972)
(striking down law that allowed dispensation of contraceptives only to married couples); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (striking down Texas law prohibiting all but lifesaving
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contraceptive use and sale will only be overturned absent a compelling
state interest.' In the case of emergency contraception, the limitation is
justified by the rights of pharmacists to exercise their religious and moral
beliefs-an interest that is not only an arguable compelling state interest,
but is also protected by the Constitution.
III.

FREE EXERCISE AMONG MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS

As urged by the plaintiffs in one pending emergency contraceptive
lawsuit that challenges the validity of Illinois's mandatory dispensation
law,55Mengesv. Blagojevich, laws requiring pharmacists to dispense emergency
contraceptives may violate pharmacists' rights under the Free Exercise
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.56

The Supreme Court's current interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause 7 allows for neutral laws of general applicability to stand and finds
only those statutes whose purpose is to hinder a particular religion to violate
the Free Exercise Clause.5" Even under this interpretation, however, the
Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance banning all animal sacrifice
and adversely affecting a religious group whose principal form of devotion
was sacrifice. 9 Even if the state is deemed to have compelling justifications
abortions); Belloti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (striking down regulation that requires
minors to obtain parental or judicial consent before having abortions). But see e.g., Maher v.
8
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479- o (1977) (upholding state law that limited state Medicaid benefits
for first-trimester abortions to those that were "medically necessary"); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 326-27 (i98o) (holding that States that participated in Medicaid were not required
to fund medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement was unavailable as a
result of the Hyde Amendment); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,51113 (1989) (upholding law that forbids use of public facilities for abortions and imposing other
restrictions); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179, 203 (199I) (upholding regulation forbidding

clinic staff from discussing all options available to women facing unintended pregnancies);
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 161o, 1638-39 (2007) (upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003 and holding that it did not impose an undue burden on the Due Process right
of women to obtain an abortion).
54 Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 154 (1973)).
55 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68 § 1330.91(0) (2OO8).
56 Menges v. Blagojevich, 451 ESupp.2d 992, 999 (C.D.Ill. 2oo6).

57 The Supreme Court has taken varied views on the protections afforded by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment since its first interpretation in Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-67 (1879). The Free Exercise Clause has been given a narrow
interpretation, as in Reynolds, then a broad interpretation that required accommodation of
religious conduct; see, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963), and once again given
a narrow interpretation; see, e.g., Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79(990).
58 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993).

59 Id. at 526, 546-47.
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for the statute-protecting public health and preventing animal crueltythe Court found the statute violated the First Amendment, because it was
not narrowly tailored to the state's interest in protecting public health and
animal welfare.'
The turning point in determining whether or not a mandatory
dispensation law can withstand constitutional scrutiny rests with its
neutrality and the means of achieving the state interest. The Supreme
Court has determined that the Free Exercise Clause affords no right to
a religious exemption from neutral laws that happen to burden religious
practices. 61 Facially, broad mandatory dispensation statutes seem neutral
and thus able to stand. The Illinois statute is an example. It provides as
follows:
Upon receipt of a valid, lawful prescription for a contraceptive, a retail
pharmacy serving the general public must dispense the contraceptive,
or a suitable alternative permitted by the prescriber, to the patient or
the patient's agent without delay, consistent with the normal timeframe
for filling any other prescription ... Under any circumstances an unfilled

prescription for contraceptive drugs must be returned to the patient if the
patient so directs.62
But, as in the Menges case discussed above, when the statute is enacted
in response to current religious activity, it may not be viewed as neutral,
despite being generally applicable. Statutes, therefore, that apply generally
to all pharmacists and all medications may violate the Free Exercise
Clause, under its current interpretation, even though they do not target
any specific religious group or practice, since they were enacted in response
to religious behavior. Furthermore, although an express accommodation is
not required by the Free Exercise Clause, broad mandatory dispensation
statutes are likely to be deemed too broad, and thus not narrowly tailored.
In order for a statute to be narrowly tailored there must be no other, less
63
restrictive alternative available.
Mandatory dispensation statutes are broad-requiring pharmacists to
dispense all lawful prescriptions. A typical mandatory dispensation statute
does not make exceptions or suggest alternative methods of compliance
for workers with strong religious beliefs or moral convictions against
dispensing certain drugs. States could achieve their goals of protecting
women's health and rights to privacy by less restrictive means. 64 Because

60 Id. at 546-47.
61 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990).

6z

ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, §1330.91(j)(1) (2008).
63 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 78 1, 798-99 (198 1) (citing U.S. v. Albertini, 475
U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
64 See infra text accompanying notes 75-1I.
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such less restrictive means exist, current state legislation is not narrowly
tailored and will likely fail strict scrutiny analysis.
However, even if mandatory dispensation statutes are upheld as
neutral and narrowly tailored, statutes requiring dispensation regardless of
moral convictions still face problems in overcoming challenges based on
other constitutional guarantees and provisions of federal law. Mandatory
dispensation statutes may also be problematic under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. The same Equal Protection principals that
invalidate statutes permitting denial of certain type of pharmaceuticals
and not others, also render problematic those statutes that require
persons, regardless of religious convictions, to dispense contraceptives
indiscriminately.
Additionally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196465 makes it unlawful
for an employer to discriminate against any individual on the basis of his
race, color, sex, national origin or religion. 66 Courts have recognized that
there are two theories under which an employer may exercise religious
discrimination: 67 through disparate treatment 6s or through failure to
accommodate. 69 State and local statutes requiring mandatory dispensation
of all valid prescriptions present a problem under the second theory as
discussed below.
The religious accommodation theory requires an employer to "actively
attempt to accommodate an employee's religious expression or conduct
even if, absent the religious motivation, the employee's conduct would
supply a legitimate ground for discharge."70 In an instance where a
pharmacist is opposed to filling a certain prescription based on his or her
religious convictions, or because doing so is proscribed by his religion, the
employer must make an accommodation to allow this pharmacist not to fill
the prescription. Failure to accommodate by requiring the pharmacist to
dispense the medication would constitute unlawful discrimination under
Title VII.
The competing interests of legislation and religious accommodation
put the employer in a sort of "catch 22," requiring him to either force the
religious objector to dispense medication through disciplinary action in
violation of Title VII, or allow the pharmacist not to fill the prescription and
violate the state statute requiring dispensation. Courts have reconciled this

65

42 U.S.C. §

2oooe-2 (2oo8).

66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Mann v. Frank, 7 E3d 1365, 1368-70 (8th Cir.1993) (analyzing discrimination
suit as involving two separate theories).
68 Id. at 1370.
69 See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75 (1977).
70 Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, ioi F.3d 1012, 1o18 (4th Cir. 1996).
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issue by recognizing that when making an accommodation would present an
undue hardship, the employer will not be in violation of Title VII for failing
to make an accommodation.7 In Trans WorldAirlines, Inc. v. Hardison,7" the
Supreme Court defined "undue hardship" as any act that would require
an employer to bear greater than a "de minimis cost" in accommodating
an employee's religious beliefs,7 3 and stated that "'de minimis cost' entails
not only monetary concerns, but also the employer's burden in conducting
its business. 74 Certainly, violating a state law imposes more than a de
minimis cost on the employer and failure to accommodate would likely
not constitute a Title VII violation. Despite this possibility that failure to
accommodate may technically comply with Title VII, it seems unlikely that
courts would be willing to uphold a state statute that provides for regular
religious discrimination in the face of a federal statute that prohibits it.
Pharmacists' rights are clearly protected by several areas of law that
make mandatory dispensation statutes problematic. However, as explained
above, patients' rights are protected by similarly problematic statutes.
Therefore, it is imperative that a more balanced solution be found.
IV A WORKABLE

BALANCE

A. The Problem with Current "Solutions"
Recently, several solutions have been proposed to address the
difficulty in balancing the protected interests. 75 All of them, however,
prove problematic, either facially or in practice. In 2005, Senator Barbara
Boxer introduced the Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act76 to amend
Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Security Act.77 The Act would require
all pharmacies accepting federal Medicare and Medicaid funding to fill
all valid prescriptions "without unnecessary delay or other interference,
consistent with the normal timeframe for filling prescriptions."78 The
Act would also require the pharmacy either to order any medication not

71 See E.E.O.C. v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., Io8 E3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
an employer who has made no efforts to accommodate the religious beliefs of an employee or
applicant before taking action against him may only prevail if it shows that no accommodation
could have been made without undue hardship).
72 432 U.S. 63 (I977).

73 Id. at 84.
74 Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 E3d 633,636 (1 ith Cir. 1995) (citing Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (I977)), cert.denied, 515 U.S. 1152 (995).

75 See, e.g., Access to Birth Control Act, H.R. 2596, iioth Cong. (referred to House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, June 6, 2007).
76 S.7 7 8, Io9th Cong. (2005).
77 Id.
78 Id. § 1898 (a)(1).
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in stock, or transfer the 79prescription to another pharmacy that carried the
medication in question.
The Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act almost passes as permissible
exercise of the Congress's power to condition federal funding. As iterated
by the Court in South Dakota v. Dole, 0 constitutional conditional spending
requires that: (1) the condition promote "the general welfare;" (2) the
condition be unambiguous; and (3) the condition relate "to the federal
interest in particular national projects or programs."81
The Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act clearly meets these three
requirements. However, the Court also noted in Dole that Congress cannot
use its spending power to induce unconstitutional acts.z The Pharmacy
Consumer Protection Act cannot stand up to this restriction-it requires
pharmacists to dispense drugs without interference regardless of their
personal religious views. There is no room in this bill for accommodations for
pharmacists whose religion prohibits them from prescribing contraceptives
or other sexual health medications. As noted in the discussion of state
mandatory dispensation statutes, statutes that force pharmacists to engage
in acts contrary to their religion may violate the Free Exercise Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause.83 Similarly, then, a statute that in essence
induces a pharmacy to disregard their pharmacists' religious convictions and
forces dispensation of all pharmaceuticals, i.e. violates the Free Exercise
Clause and Equal Protection Clause, is an unconstitutional condition on
spending.
The Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act never became law, but it would
not have been a workable solution because it failed to balance both parties'
interests. Another bill, the Access to Birth Control Act,' goes further in
attempting to balance both parties' interests. The Access to Birth Control
Act, introduced in June of 2007 by Representative Carolyn Maloney,
prohibits pharmacists from: intimidating or harassing customers who
s6
s5
request contraception interfering with the delivery of contraception
providing misinformation about the contraceptive's mechanism of action,878
and refusing to return a valid prescription to the customer upon request.1
But, the Access to Birth Control Act adds an additional provision that state
79 Id. § 1898 (a)(2).
8o South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
81 Id. at 207.
82 Id. at 2lO.
83 See supratext accompanying notes 55-74.
84 Access to Birth Control Act, H.R. 2596, 1ioth Cong. (referred to House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, June 6, 2007).
85 Id. § 249(a)(3)(A).
86 Id. § 249(a)(3)(B).
87 Id. § 249(a)(3)(C).
88 Id. § 249(a)(3)(E).

2008-2009]

BALANCING RELIGION AND PATIENT RIGHTS

533

mandatory dispensation statutes and the Pharmacy Consumer Protection
Act fail to consider, a right of conscience accommodation for religious
objectors. 89 The Access to Birth Control Act contemplates an option
whereby religious objectors can avoid filling a prescription by asking
another pharmacist to fill the prescription instead, or by transferring the
prescription to another pharmacy.9
On its face, the Access to Birth Control Act seems to strike a workable
balance between the patient's and the pharmacist's rights. Under the Act,
women would be able to get the contraceptives prescribed to them without
misinformation, harassment, or a moral scolding. In addition, women
would receive the prescribed contraceptive in a timely manner. In this
way, the Act preserves women's protected rights of privacy, allowing them
the freedom to choose to procreate or not. Equal Protection concerns,
like those in Hathaway,91 that prohibit denial of one class of medication
or procedure, when others of similar risk and cost are available, would also
vanish because patients would no longer be denied access to one particular
class of pharmaceuticals. Not only are the patient's rights preserved, but
also the pharmacists who are opposed to contraception for religious reasons
could avoid participating in dispensing and distributing the drug through
an express religious accommodation. Thus, Title VII rights, as well as Free
Exercise rights and Equal Protection rights of the pharmacists are also
considered and protected by the Access to Birth Control Act.
Judy Waxman, Vice President for Health and Reproductive Rights at
the National Women's Law Center, says the bill ensures that "every woman
who goes to a pharmacy for contraception will leave with her medication in
hand and her dignity in tact [sic]." 9 In its practical application, however,
the Access to Birth Control Act may not prove to be the perfect solution.
In fact, in practice the act may be no more effective in protecting the rights
of women or pharmacists than mandatory dispensation statutes or express
refusal regulations.
Representative Jay Inslee (D-WA) notes that "Women in need of birth
control or emergency contraception should never have to go on a wild goose
chase to get FDA-approved medication from a licensed pharmacist," 93
and the Act will ensure this will not happen. Women, however, may still
end up on a wild goose chase. Patients' rights become a concern when
the Act is looked at from a practical and not a strict textual viewpoint.
The Act contemplates an objecting pharmacist notifies the patient, in a
89 Id. § 249(c).
90 Id.
91 Hathaway v. Worchester City Hosp., 475 Ezd 701 (ist Cir. 1973).
92 Women's Groups Rally behind BipartisanBillto Stop PharmacyBirth ControlRefusals, June
6, 2007, http://maloney.house.gov/index.php?option=content&task=view&id= I 3 6 3 &Itemid=
61.
93 Id.
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non-harassing, threatening or condescending manner, that he or she is
opposed to the medication, and asks another pharmacist on duty to fill the
prescription or volunteer to transfer the prescription to another pharmacy. 4
But, the reality is that many religious objectors are not only concerned with
having to physically dispense the medication themselves. 95 On the contrary,
for many religious objectors the medication presents such a problem they
may actually try to actively hinder dispensation. 96
Furthermore, because the bill contemplates that every woman will get
her medication in a timely manner, though pharmacists may opt out of
actually filling the prescription themselves, it is even more problematic.
In order for compliance with the act to be feasible, a pharmacy would be
required to have at least two pharmacists on duty for every single shift. If a
pharmacy is staffed with only the objecting pharmacist, who has the right
to opt out of filling the prescription, then assuming the pharmacist is able to
put aside his objections and ask another pharmacist to fill the prescription,
he must call another pharmacist and ask him or her to come to the pharmacy
and fill the prescription. At a minimum, the patient is likely delayed at
least an hour in getting her medication. Thus, the pharmacy has not been
able to comply with the Access to Birth Control Act, and the woman faces
an increased risk that the medication will not be effective because of the
delay. The only way to comply, therefore, with both provisions of the act
is for a pharmacy to always staff another pharmacist to cover the religious
objector who refuses to participate in filling the prescription.
Requiring a pharmacy to staff two pharmacists at one time is also
problematic. In Noesen v. MedicalStaffingNetwork, 97 the court, in recognizing
that employers are not required to grant an accommodation if it will
impose an undue hardship,9" held that a Roman Catholic pharmacist who
was opposed to filling prescriptions for birth control and refused to have
contact with the patients requesting it, was not entitled to relief of his
counter or telephone duties. 9 The court pointed out that a reasonable
accommodation is one that "eliminates the conflict between employment
requirements and religious practices," 1°° but not one that would work an
undue hardship on the employer or other employees. 1 1 In that case, the
Seventh Circuit decided that relieving the pharmacist of counter duties
would create an undue hardship, because it not only creates a burden
in scheduling, but it also creates a disproportionate workload for other
94 Id.
95 See supra text accompanying notes

21-28.

96 Id.
97 Noesen v. Medical Staffing Network, 232 Fed.App. 581 (7th Cit. 2007).
98 Id. at 584.
99 Id.
ioo Id. (citing Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986)).
ioi Id. at 584.
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employees.10 The Seventh Circuit came to a similar conclusion, in Endres
v. Indiana State Police'03 with an employee who sought to be excused only
from those tasks to which he had objection. Again, the court reasoned,
this created an unreasonable hardship by placing a strain on managers in
scheduling and assigning tasks consistent with employee beliefs. Further,
it created an undue burden on other employees, who suffered an increase
in workload and distraction from their normal tasks, in order to fill in for
the objectors. "o
Accordingly, courts likely would not require an accommodation to be
made for pharmacists with objections to filling certain types of prescriptions.
Certainly, it would place a strain on managers to ensure the schedule is such
that someone else is always there to fill the prescription should a patient
need contraceptives, during an objector's shift. Further, increased staffing to
cover for the objector creates increased costs for the pharmacy in the form
of wages, and increased costs to other employees, who will be pulled from
their normal tasks to fill in for the religious objector will be similarly high.
In light of such high costs to employer and other employees, it is doubtful
that any court would find the pharmacist entitled to an accommodation,
which basically leaves pharmacies back at square one-with a mandatory
dispensation statute.
The forms of proposed legislation fail to adequately comply with
federal and constitutional guarantees such that they offer little solution to
the delicate balance that must be found between the pharmacists' rights
and the patients' rights. A workable solution will still need to be created.
B. Striking a Balance
Perhaps the best method of protecting the conflicting rights and interests
at stake here is one that allows for personal choice on behalf of all parties.
One such possibility contemplates allowing each individual pharmacy
to determine its own policy with regard to contraceptives, emergency
contraceptives and sexual health medications. States should create a system
requiring pharmacies to develop a detailed policy on dispensing sexual
health medicines, i.e., what sexual health medications they will distribute
and whether or not they will impose restrictions on any sort of access. In
addition to requiring individual policy development, states should create a
registry or directory, wherein pharmacies will list their policy and whether
or not a patient will be able to obtain a particular sexual health medication
from the pharmacy. In addition to submitting their policy to the directory,
pharmacies who refuse to dispense should be required to post their policy

102 Id.
103 Endres v. Indiana State Police, 349 E3d 922 (7th Cir. zoo3).
io4 Id. at 925.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 97

at their doorway in a clear, easy to understand format including information
about how to obtain the directory of pharmacy policies. Failure to comply
with the terms of their own published policy or failure to post their policy
to the directory or at their door should result in a fine.
For example, X Pharmacy may decide that it will fill all prescriptions for
birth-control and sexual health medications but refuse to fill prescriptions
for emergency contraceptive pills. X Pharmacy will outline its policy in detail
and submit it to the state directory, which will notify patients that X will fill
prescriptions for birth-control pills and sexual health medications, but not
emergency contraceptives. X Pharmacy will also hang a sign at its door that
states that X Pharmacy will not dispense emergency contraceptives. Should
X Pharmacy subsequently refuse to dispense a birth-control prescription,
X Pharmacy would be subject to fines.
Such a statute would serve to protect the interests of all parties
involved. Individual pharmacies would be free to choose a policy that
fits with their beliefs, morals and company philosophy. Women's rights
would also be protected. Women will have access to an easy to understand
directory outlining where they may obtain different forms of sexual health
medications and contraceptives. Because sanctions would be imposed on
pharmacies who fail to comply with their stated policies, women would
be able to rely reasonably on the information contained in the directory or
posted at the pharmacy door and would not find themselves subjected to
shame, a moral scolding, or a denial of their prescription.
Ultimately, the right of privacy and autonomy seeks to ensure that
women (and families) have the personal right to choose whether or not
to procreate or use contraceptives. 10 A statute providing women the
opportunity to learn a pharmacy's policy in advance allows women this
choice. She can obtain the policies of pharmacies in advance, determine
which one matches with her choices about procreation and contraception
and exercise these choices, free from pharmacist interference.
This policy alone does not, however, ensure that all women have easy
access to emergency contraception. Because pharmacies are still free to
develop their own policies, there will undoubtedly be pharmacies that
choose not to dispense. For women in urban areas this will likely not pose
a problem. A woman in need of emergency contraception will consult the
directory, see that one pharmacy does not dispense the pills and simply
take her prescription to the next nearest pharmacy. But for women in rural
areas, this process might not be so easy. A woman in a rural area might
find that the only pharmacy in her town does not dispense emergency
contraception and may have to travel to the nearest city in order to have
her prescription filled. In a situation in which a woman is looking to fill
her prescription for normal hormonal birth-control pills, this would be an

105 See supranote 53.
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inconvenience. But, in a situation in which a woman needs to have her
prescription for emergency contraceptives filled, the difference between
towns may mean the difference between an unplanned pregnancy and an
effective contraceptive.
Such a situation could be avoided by adopting a policy urging physicians
and gynecologists to offer to provide a prescription for emergency
contraception to any woman as part of her annual examination. The woman
could then take her prescription to a pharmacy promising to dispense
emergency contraceptives, have it filled and keep it on hand for when it is
needed. This way, she is able to gain quick and easy access to emergency
contraceptives while the rights of pharmacists and pharmacies rights are
still preserved.
Under such a plan, assuming a woman's doctor could provide an
emergency contraceptive prescription at her annual exam, pharmacists
would not be subject to a mandatory dispensation statute that forces
them to fill prescriptions that violate their religious and moral ethics.
The most likely situation under this plan would entail a pharmacist with
religious objections working at a pharmacy with a non-dispense policy.
In that scenario a pharmacist would never be forced to dispense against
his will. Unfortunately, in some instances a religious objector may find
himself subject to a mandatory dispensation policy at his pharmacy. This
situation, while perhaps unfortunate, is not a violation of protected federal
or constitutional rights.
Pharmacists are protected against state or federal mandatory
dispensation statutes because of their Free Exercise, Equal Protection and
Title VII, rights. As the court noted in the Civil Rights Cases,1°6 the acts of
private individuals do not fall within the provisions of the Free Exercise
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. 107 Since here we have individual
pharmacies establishing their own private policies, they do not fall within
the provisions of the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause. Only those pharmacists forced to dispense at a state sponsored
pharmacy with a dispensation policy would be able to make a claim under
these constitutional guarantees.
Additionally, pharmacists would find themselves without Title VII
protection for their refusals at a pharmacy with a dispensation policy.
As described above,""' Title VII requires employers to provide an
accommodation to employees who cannot complete an assigned task based
on religious beliefs," ° except when doing so would place an unreasonable
burden on the employer or on other employees." 0 The same concerns are
io6 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
107 Id. at 21.

io8 See supra text accompanying notes 58-77.
i09 See supratext accompanying notes 70-76.
1 i Seesupra text accompanying note 37.
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present under this plan, as were present under the Access to Birth Control
Actn'1 -allowing pharmacists to divert their tasks or requiring employers
to staff at least two pharmacists at all times would create a considerable
hardship, financially and physically, on the employer and other employees. As
such, the pharmacists would likely not be entitled to an accommodation.
The fact that a pharmacist is not likely to get an accommodation
does not, however, suggest that the pharmacist is without recourse. On
the contrary, the proposed system of a directory of dispensation policies
serves not only to advance patient rights, but pharmacists' rights as well.
New pharmacists can consult the directory to find a potential employer
whose policies regarding sexual health medications are in line with their
own. Pharmacists finding themselves at a pharmacy that has adopted a
mandatory dispensation policy of a drug the pharmacist is opposed to will
be able to utilize the directory to find more suitable employment, which is
more in line with that pharmacists' religious ideals.
CONCLUSION

As the foregoing discussion has illustrated, both pharmacists whose
religious norms clash with patients' demands and patients themselves
have clear and established rights which are not in harmony. Although state
legislatures have seen the need to further protect these rights, a workable
solution that protects the interests of both groups has yet to be found. In
fact, nearly every measure proposed has left one group's rights unaccounted
for.
Mandatory dispensation statutes, which are becoming more popular and
more controversial, overstep a pharmacist's rights of Free Exercise, Equal
Protection, and his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,"' while
express refusal statutes allow the patient's fundamental right of privacy and
autonomy to go completely unaccounted. These rights conflict so much
that there is no absolutely perfect solution that guarantees every patient
her medicine without any delay or inconvenience such that no pharmacist
is ever faced with a situation where he may have to dispense a medication
to which he is morally opposed.
A statute that requires pharmacies to select their own policies regarding
contraceptives and sexual health medication, to publish that policy, and
to be required to adhere to the stated policy, however, is a near perfect
solution to the delicate balance of protected rights. With cooperation from
physicians and compliance within the pharmacies, women will be able
to access the pharmaceuticals prescribed to them without delay, hassle,
misinformation, or shame. Women will be able to find a pharmacist who

iii See supra text accompanying notes 89-1oo.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 58-78.
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will allow them to exercise their choice to use or not to use contraceptives.
Pharmacists, on the other hand, will more easily schedule their careers to
line up with their moral and religious convictions. A pharmacist will easily
be able to determine a pharmacy's policy on sexual health medications and
contraceptives and therefore more easily find employment with a pharmacy
that shares his value system.
An individualized sexual health medication policy, when accompanied
by a directory program, policy publication and compliance supervision,
is the best, and possibly only method of insuring all rights at stake are
protected.

